

"He that fights, and goes away,

"May live to fight another day;

"And, when the fight becomes a chase,

"He wins the day that wins the race."—HUDIBRAS.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PORTUGAL.—The two common-place couplets, which I have taken for my motto to this Number, which the celebrated author of them used, in his mock-heroic poem, in an ironical sense, and which have generally, heretofore, been in such sense applied to events in real life, may, (if our intelligence be correct) be literally applied to the recent events in Portugal, and understood as conveying serious commendation on the conduct of our Commander, who fought at Busaço, who, immediately after went thence with great celerity, and who has lived to fight another day, and that, too, according to all our intelligence up to this time (Monday morning, 22nd October,) with every chance in his favour, and with almost a dead certainty of gaining a glorious and decisive victory. The fight, or the contest, between Baron Douro of Wellesley and Viscount Wellington of Talavera and the French Marshal, the Prince of Essling, whose name is Massena, has, in fact, been a chase. The two armies were at, probably, when they started, *four hundred miles* (by the road) from the spot where they now are, and at which spot, being a very strong, if not impenetrable, position, our Commander and his army arrived first. That is to say, he, in the language of my motto, won the race, and thus far, at least, he may be considered as victorious.—In a former Number (page 661), I expressed my dislike to the detailing of the events of a campaign, such as the present, by piecemeal; because such a mode of proceeding always greatly diminished the pleasure of contemplating final success; and I added, that, in the case before us, the final overthrow, the route, the destruction, or the capture, of Massena and his army, when it should happen, would not afford nearly so much satisfaction, as it would have afforded, if we had never heard of the Victory of Busaço.—The objections, however, to this sort of anticipation seem now to be removed, or, rather, there can be

no more anticipation, and the time is come for recording the events of the campaign, seeing that, when the last Dispatches came away, every thing was prepared for the final battle, and that, in all probability, the intelligence of that battle having been fought, and of the last victory having been gained, will reach us before this sheet gets into the press. So near the close as this; with the whole historical materials of the campaign lying before us; and with nothing to add but a sentence or two, just to describe the time and manner in which our Commander gave the desperate enemy the *coup-de-grace*, or, in plain English, *put him out of his misery*; thus circumstanced, it would be wrong any longer to delay giving, or, at any rate, attempting to give, a brief history of this interesting, and will be long-remembered campaign.

—The campaign did not, as far as we have much interest in it, begin till after the fall of CIUDAD RODRIGO, a large city of Spain, about 20 miles (English) from the frontiers of Portugal. This city the French, under the chief command of Massena, had completely invested so early as the 11th of June last, and, after a most gallant defence, under the command of DON ANDRES HAVESTI, it surrendered on the 10th of July. (See page 188.) During this siege, the head quarters of our army, under its present Commander, Viscount of Talavera, was at Alverca, a small place about twenty miles from Ciudad Rodrigo, our advanced guard, under General Craufurd, being placed between that city and our head quarters. On the 4th of July Massena sent forward a body of troops, at the approach of whom General Craufurd fell back (See page 188) into the neighbourhood of Fort Concepcion, which is situated between Ciudad Rodrigo and ALMEIDA, the latter being a strongly fortified place, one of the frontier towns of Portugal, and situated at about ten miles from the frontiers. Some little skirmishing took place upon this occasion, in which our troops and those of Portugal distinguished themselves.—We must

now, for want of ample details in an official form, have recourse to those of a sort of *accredited* news-paper authority, it being of much importance, that we confine ourselves to what has been asserted, from time to time, by those of our public journals, which are looked upon, or, at least, which choose to look upon themselves, as being most friendly towards the Ministry, and are, therefore, vulgarly called ministerial news-papers.—By these prints, we were told in the latter end of July, that the French army were oppressed by every sort of calamity; that they had recently been beaten in such a manner by the Spaniards at Pandeo, whence four hundred carts loaded with wounded French had been sent into Madrid; that a considerable portion of their army had actually deserted and gone over to the Spaniards, and that the remainder was full of discontent. We were at the same time assured, that the Portuguese soldiers behaved well, and had displayed great steadiness and courage (see page 143).—The French newspapers, in remarking upon this information, insisted upon it that it was intended to deceive the people of England; and added, somewhat sarcastically, that while all these favourable appearances for the English existed, the French were besieging Ciudad Rodrigo, and the English quietly looked on, though the cries of the inhabitants were heard in their camp (see page 180 and onwards).—In answer to this, our ministerial news-papers insisted, that it would have been bad policy in us to attempt to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo; but that the cause of Portugal was in no danger whatever; that independently of the natural strength of Portugal, there were various fortified places, which were *adequately garrisoned* and must be regularly besieged, among which were Elvas, Almeida, Penishe, St. Julien and Caceres; that, besides, we had complete military possession of the country, all the resources of which were at our disposal, and all the people hearty in our cause and strenuous in their exertions; that in every part of the Peninsula, the prospect was fairer than ever, and in short, that there appeared to be no doubt of ultimate success; and the superiority of our troops over those of the French was confirmed by the dispatch of Lord Talavera giving an account of skirmishes with the enemy.—The former dispatch of our commander was, as we have seen, dated at Alverca, on the 11th of July. In his next, dated on the 28th of July, he gave us an

account of the attack made by the French upon gen. Craufurd's advanced guard near Fort Conception, where the enemy assailed him in his position, overpowered him by numbers, and drove him back, with considerable loss (see page 221 and onwards).—Coeval with this intelligence were the assurances of the Morning Post and other ministerial prints, that our army in Portugal was full of confidence, that the Portuguese soldiers behaved admirably, and that, in general Craufurd's affair we gave the enemy an *earnest of what may be expected in a general engagement* (see page 212).—The next dispatch of Lord Talavera of which the public in England have any knowledge, was dated on the 29th of August at Celorico. But we must first see what we had been told at home in the interval. It had been stated to us that Massena had been outwitted by our Commander; that the former had hoped that we should *relieve Rodrigo*; next, that we should *make a stand* at Fort Conception, and lastly that we should *risk a battle* for the sake of Almeida; in all which hopes the Frenchmen had been disappointed. We were further told, that Massena had made a movement forward with a view of *turning us*, but that our Commander, "with great judgment and promptitude, *disappointed it by throwing back his flank*," which we were told, made the enemy *retreat* with all possible speed. It was added at this time that desertions were still very great in the French army, and that our Portuguese allies had uniformly conducted themselves very gallantly. (See page 239.)—After this it appears (from the authority before mentioned, of course) that the French army became sorely afflicted with the dysentery, while our troops were free from that disease; that the main body of them, instead of advancing, had retreated, perhaps for want of provisions; that the Portuguese militia were numerous and fully prepared to meet the French, whose soldiers were deserting in all directions; that his languid operations had falsified the predictions of Lords Grenville and Grey; that Lord Talavera's army was in the highest health and spirits; that (and several instances were given) the Spaniards and Portuguese were beating the French and driving them before them wherever they came near them; that, at last Massena was in *full retreat*, owing to want of provisions and to desertion, disaffection and sickness; and that Lord Talavera, whose army had plenty of provisions, had

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certainly once offered Massena battle, and that Massena had as certainly declined the offer. (See page 283.)—By the 12th of September, our authority seemed to waver as to numbers, and an attempt was made to diminish the force of our army. That point, however, was set to rights, and we still saw our commander with 60 thousand fighting men. We were now informed that the siege of Almeida had been commenced, and that the English Chief was concentrating his forces, with a view of compelling the French to keep in a collected body, and thus increase their difficulty of getting provisions, (see page 340).—The dispatch, which was just mentioned above, dated at Celorico on the 29th of August, gave us official information, that Almeida had fallen, and that our army had moved into the valley of Mondego; that the enemy had attacked our picquets, and had been repulsed. About the time that this dispatch was received, we saw an order of Lord Talavera, respecting letters written from the Army being published in newspapers, (see page 444 and 442.)—Our home authority before mentioned, now repeated to us, with more confidence than ever, that the soldiers of the French army were discontented in the highest degree; that the Portuguese intended to erect a monument to perpetuate the memory of that British generosity by which the independence of Portugal had been maintained; that though Almeida had fallen our prospects were none the worse for that; that the fall of that fortress would have no *influence* in the fortunes of the campaign; and, we were now told, in a very detailed account, that the English army consisted of 30,000 men, the Portuguese regulars of 59,755, and the Portuguese militia of 52,848, making a total of 142,603; a number far greater than it had ever been supposed Massena's army amounted to, even before that army had been wasted by hunger, sickness and desertion, (see page 406.)—Before any further dispatches came, we were told that Massena's circumstances had not been at all bettered by the fall of Almeida, and that the hopes that the opposition party entertained as to the destructive operation of the French against our army would prove delusive, (see page 437.)—The accounts, which we received through the French papers, which contained Massena's report of the siege and surrender of Almeida (see page 446 to 448 and 503 to

507); these accounts were calculated to give us a different impression as to the consequences of the fall of Almeida. We saw in that account, every reason to fear that the French would now be able to follow up their advantages. These fears were, too, rather augmented than lessened by the next dispatches of our commander, which was dated at Gouvea, on the fifth of September, and which gave us an account of the treachery and cowardice of the Lieutenant Governor and the commander of Artillery in the fortress of Almeida (see page 598).—Nevertheless, it appeared, from the aforementioned authority, that the cause was in as fair a way as ever, and though a conspiracy had, soon after this, been detected in Lisbon and in other parts of Portugal, the Government of that country was perfectly secure, and the people perfectly loyal; that the French army was greatly diminished in numbers; that Massena could bring only 50,000 men to face us in the field, while we had 30,000 British soldiers actually present, which number, when all the reinforcements arrived, would be augmented to 40,000, and while we had double the number of Portuguese, who had given so many proofs of their valour, and of their devotion to the cause (see page 545).—It now appeared, from the same authorities, that things were in the most encouraging situation (this was on the 10th instant); that nearly the whole population of the country accompanied our commander in his movements, who destroyed such part of their property as they were unable to remove; that Massena by advancing in an exhausted country must add to the embarrassments he previously laboured under from the insufficiency of his supplies; that our commander, in addition to the advantage of a strong mountainous position, had concentrated his forces, brought the Portuguese army within the range of his operations, and drawn nearer to his main resources, while the enemy got further from his supplies, was compelled to divide his forces, and was exposed to attacks from the mountains (see page 593).—Such was the state of things, agreeably to our intelligence (from the sources before mentioned) on the 10th of this present month, at which time our last dispatches from Lord Talavera came down to the 5th of September, and were dated at Gouvea, a place situated at about 80 miles from Ciudad Rodrigo, 60 from the Eastern frontiers of Portugal, about

30 from Almeida, and about 25 or 30 from Celorico, the place where his former dispatches were dated.—After waiting eight days without any fresh official communications from Portugal, which brought us to a distance of thirty nine days from the date of the dispatches just mentioned, we had, on Sunday the 14th instant, announced to us from the mouth of the Park and Tower guns, the intelligence of the victory of Busaço, won upon a ridge of hills of that name situated at a distance of about fifty miles from Gouvea, and at a few miles distance from the City of Coimbra. In this victory, which was gained on the memorable 27th September, we are officially informed, we killed two thousand French, the wounded being immense. The enemy, our commander says in his dispatch, did not (and well he might not) renew his attack on the 28th; *except by the fire of his light troops*, but that he moved a large body of his army in such a direction as induced our Viscount to withdraw from the mountains of Busaço, that is to say from the field of battle, and to take his army in a Southern direction, that is to say, nearer to Lisbon, that is to say, further from the place where the two armies started, and nearer to our commander's strong holds, his reinforcements, and his shipping. In this dispatch, (see page 662) which is dated from Coimbra on the 30th of September, and to which, for an account of the particular acts of bravery performed by the officers and soldiers of the allied army, I beg leave to refer the reader; in this celebrated dispatch, the noble Viscount says, that this movement has afforded him a favourable opportunity of shewing the enemy the description of troops of which his army was composed; that the Portuguese troops were worthy of contending in the same ranks with British troops; that Marshal Beresford had so disciplined the Portuguese army, that the latter had shown itself capable of engaging and defeating the enemy; that, throughout the contest upon the Sierra de Busaço, and in all the previous marches, and in those which he had since made (that is to say between the Victory and the date of his dispatch), "the whole army, says he, *has conducted themselves in the most regular manner; Accordingly all the operations have been carried on with ease; the soldiers have suffered no privations, have undergone no unnecessary fatigue, there has been no loss of stores, and the army is in the highest*

"spirits." To all which he added, on the other side, that the enemy's communication with Almeida was completely cut off, and that he "*possessed only the ground on which his army stood.*"—This is the last intelligence, which has been communicated to us *officially*, and this, as was before observed, was dated at Coimbra, on the 30th of September. What was left unexplained by the Dispatch of the Noble Viscount of Talavera was fully communicated to us by the Ministerial Prints, the MORNING POST and the COURIER, who, upon information which they said was of the most authentic nature, stated, that our army had actually *buried* the 2,000 French, whom they killed on the 27th of September, and that the number of wounded French was 8,000, so that the enemy had lost, in this defeat, not less, at any rate, than 10,000 men; that the enemy was driven to despair for want of provisions; that, in the dead Frenchmen's haversacks, nothing but a little Indian Corn was found; that it was by mere accident, that the whole of the enemy's army was not captured, and that, as to an *escape* by the way of the North that was impossible.—Upon this occasion the MORNING POST (15th October) said, in a tone of moderation, that it should "not indulge in any triumph *over its political adversaries*, who had "blamed the ministers for employing and "re-inforcing our army in Portugal."—On the 17th instant (for we will now stick to particular days) the Morning Post said, that those writers who endeavoured to detract from the merits of the victory of Busaço ought to be exposed to the public; on the 18th, the same print said, that we offered battle to Massena on the 28th of September; that it was uncertain whether Massena would follow our army across the Mondego (that is to say about 25 miles from the place where he then was), but if he did, he would get *another* drubbing. On the 19th instant the same print said, that when Massena left Almeida he had 13 days provisions with him (which, of course, were all spent before he got to Busaço); that the prisoners had their *knapsacks full of Indian Corn* unground, all the mills having been destroyed before the French came; that each French soldier was obliged to *pound his own Corn*; that the City of Coimbra would be entirely evacuated by its inhabitants, who would carry away their effects; that Lord Wellington had proved his superiority over Massena in every respect;

that there were at least 20 thousand men in the north together with a Spanish army rapidly collecting to harass the French in that quarter; that the armed peasantry with two brigades of Portuguese troops, under colonels Miller and Trant, were "*operating upon Massena's communications*;" that Lord Talavera with an increasing army was in Massena's front; that the country did not afford supplies for its own inhabitants; that Lord Talavera was obliged to get part of his from his ships; that of course, Massena could get none; that his men were actually starving before he was defeated; and that since his defeat the discontents and desertions of his army had been greater than ever.—On the 20th instant, the same print told us that dispatches had been received from Lord Talavera, dated Alcobaça, that is to say at about 70 miles from Coimbra along by the sea coast towards Lisbon; that these dispatches were dated on the 6th of October; that our army had retired gradually, first to Pombal, next to Leyria, and next to Alcobaça, having, by this gradual retiring, travelled 70 miles in 6 days; that there had been skirmishing almost daily, and that the advantage had uniformly been in favour of the British; that our commander had accomplished his object of giving time to the inhabitants of Coimbra to remove themselves and their property; that Coimbra and all the villages on the same day were deserted; that, whatever might be the opinion which prejudiced persons might be induced to build on present appearances, the public might be assured, that the British Chief was pursuing a plan *long meditated* by him, and now acted upon, not from necessity, but from judgment and choice; that a letter from Massena had been intercepted, in which he represents the difficulties of his advance, from the state of the roads and the circumstances of the country; that the English and Portuguese armies were in excellent health and spirits. The same print, under the same date, added, in another part of its pages, that the enemy's ravages were horrible; that the Porto road was covered with dead horses, mules, and bullocks; that the whole country was a scene of complete devastation; that such rapine, violations and murders were never before heard of; that many villages, towns, and country villas had been burned to the ground; that every place was deserted; that

large tracts of Indian corn had been trodden down; that every thing was destroyed; and that, notwithstanding all this the people universally *blessed the English* and *execrated the French*. —On the 22nd instant, the same print, the Morning Post, communicated to the public, the following Bulletin, under authority of the Government in Downing Street:—"BULLETIN.—DOWNING-STREET, Oct. 20.—Dispatches have been received from Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, of the 13th instant, by which it appears that the Allied Armies had retreated within their lines. Their right being at Castanhero and Villa Franca, on the Tagus, and their left at Torres Vedras, on the 7th and 8th instant. They had not been molested in their retreat, but some affairs had taken place between the cavalry of the two armies, in which the British and Portuguese cavalry distinguished themselves.—The Marquis de la Romana, with 8,000 infantry, and 1,500 cavalry, was on his march to join Lord Wellington. He had arrived at Aldea Gallega, on the Tagus, opposite to Lisbon, where transports were ready to carry him over. This movement had been masked by Mendizabal; and Mortier had fallen back towards Seville.—The rains had begun on the 8th. The British Army are protected from them in the villages and under huts. The French Army severely exposed to them. The Zezore River is more swollen.—Colonel Wilson had occupied the Sierra de Busaco with a Portuguese brigade on the 6th; and it was reported that Colonel Trant had entered Coimbra on the 7th, and had taken a French garrison, with their wounded prisoners. General Miller with another Portuguese brigade, was at Viseu. We had a strong garrison at Abrantes. Massena's head-quarters were at Rio Mayor. Lord Wellington's at Arruda, a short distance from Alenquer. General Hill was at Albandra on the Tagus. General Craufurd in rear of Arruda, and our Cavalry in rear of the Army."—Thus, we see, that, not only had our commander completely succeeded in reaching, with his whole army, his impregnable positions near Lisbon; not only had he now attained that great object, which he had so long had in view; not only had he put into complete execution the plan *long meditated by him*, and acted upon, not from necessity, but from judgment and choice; not only had he, at the time of which this

bulletin speaks, to wit, on the 13th instant, got safely within his lines, and under cover from the rains, while the enemy, that same enemy, whom he had beaten but 15 days before, was on the outside of those lines, without any villages or huts to shelter them and exposed to the "pitiless pelting of the perilous storm;" not only had our commander received all this amazing increase of advantages, but we see, that he was also about to receive, besides his English re-inforcements, a re-inforcement under the Marquis de la Romana, consisting of 8,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry.—This, then, was the situation of our army on the 13th instant, its right being protected by the Tagus, its left by the strong fortifications of Mafra and Cintra, there waiting the attack, with almost certainty of success.—The Morning Post of the 22nd instant informed us in addition to the above bulletin, that it was happy to observe, that every thing wore the most promising appearance on our side; that every thing had happened hitherto that was wished for and expected; that since the victory of Busaço Lord Talavera had as he intended from the outset of the campaign, *drawn the enemy after him*, to that very spot which he had selected as the most favourable ground upon which to wait their attack, and the manner in which this had been performed exhibited one of the most complete proofs of skilful and dextrous generalship that an admiring world ever witnessed; that he had reached this point of *pre-destination*, before the rains set in, and with his army un-impaired in every respect. It was now stated by this print that Massena's army amounted to 70,000 men, and Lord Talavera's to 60,000, though, as the reader will bear in mind, this same print had made Massena's army but 70,000, before his defeat at Busaço. In the mean time we were now positively assured, that Colonel Trant, in coming upon the rear of the French, had entered Coimbra and taken 5,000 of them prisoners; that all was destruction in the rear of the French army; that there was no way in which Massena could retreat without imminent peril; and that it must be by a *miracle* if the French commander or his army should escape.—As we now draw towards the close, we must take in the evening as well as the morning print. The Courier of the 22nd instant informed its readers, that the intelligence from Portugal was most encouraging, and that it inspired every

man with the greatest confidence; that Massena's rear was not only laid waste, but rendered very difficult for the passage of heavy artillery, that the whole line of country in the rear of him, was occupied by the Portuguese Militia under Colonel Trant, General Miller, Colonel Wilson, and Generals Silveira and Bucellar; that the position of our army was the strongest that could be conceived; that it was possible that Massena might endeavour to tread back his steps, but that this would be full of peril and difficulty; that his *wants* rendered it imperious upon him to make an attack upon us, and that in that attack, in all human probability, be the last, that the French will make in the kingdom of Portugal.—The Morning Post of this day, after an attempt to explain away what it had formerly asserted respecting our superiority of numbers, as if it were not content with a victory that will drive the French out of Portugal or make them prisoners, without the additional circumstance of doing this with inferior numbers; after this attempt, which is now made too late to be of any weight, the Morning Post proceeds to inform us, that on the 13th instant, 800 of the enemy were made prisoners, part of whom had arrived at Lisbon on the 14th instant; that the Marquis de la Romana had actually arrived with from 10 to 12,000 troops, and was then crossing the Tagus to join our army; that the position of our army was formed in three lines of defence, the rear commanding the front, so that even supposing the enemy were to carry our first lines, they could not turn their cannon against us with effect, whilst we could completely command them from the second line; that besides this, we have immense reserves of troops in the rear, and our right flank is protected by the gun-boats, sent from our men of war and transports; that the country between Coimbra and Lisbon is almost all like *Bagshot heath*, every hill a fortification, and the form a *crescent*; that within the chain, we have collected *all the produce of the country*, through which we have retreated, that we are consequently abundantly supplied, with Lisbon in our rear, and that the enemy has nothing; that within the chain, we have 70,000 fighting men, exclusive of those which are hastening on, and are ready to join under the Marquis de la Romana.—Such is the history of the campaign, up to the 13th instant, and such the relative situation of

the hostile armies on that day; thus has ended the *race*, and our Commander has fairly won it.—At the beginning of the campaign, I, with others, had in my head, the usual notions about *advancing* and *retreating*, the former of which I looked upon as a sign of *success*, and the latter as a mark of *failure*; and, as the reader will have perceived, the representations of my *authorities* were for a good while, calculated to foster this erroneous view of the matter. The putting of a garrison, too, into Almeida tended to keep me in error; because I could not see why a garrison and such immense quantities of provisions and ammunition were placed in that fortress, except for the purpose of *keeping the French back*, which seemed altogether incompatible with a plan for drawing them on into the heart of the country, and even into the neighbourhood of Lisbon. It did, besides, appear strange, that, if, as we are now, from my authorities, so positively assured, Lord Talavera's *long-meditated* plan was to draw the French after him towards Lisbon; in this case it did appear somewhat strange, that he should have exposed general Crauford's corps to an attack at Fort Conception. There were other attempts at, or shews of, *resistance*, too, which, in the case supposed, did not appear necessary to the execution of the long-meditated plan, and which, indeed, might, by giving the enemy the alarm, have defeated that plan altogether.—But, whatever effect these circumstances, which seemed to me to indicate an *unwillingness* to move back, might have had upon my mind, and especially when I saw *reinforcements* daily marching to join our Chief, and which reinforcements appeared to me to indicate any thing rather than a *design* to draw the enemy into the heart of the country; whatever effect these circumstances might have had upon my mind, before the news of the victory of Busaco was received, that news removed all doubts upon the subject. For, when I saw, that our Commander, even after beating the French, after killing out right 2,000 of their men, and "putting 10,000 of them *hors de combat*;" when I saw him after this, after so signal a victory, "*forbidding a pursuit*," and, on the contrary, turning upon his heel and making off back towards Lisbon; after seeing this, it was quite impossible for me to doubt, that his plan was to *draw the enemy after him* some whither or other; and, accordingly, it now appears, that this deep laid scheme of drawing the

enemy from the frontiers to *Torres Vedras*, a distance (including all the windings) of not less than 400 good miles, has succeeded even beyond expectation, and, perhaps, beyond the limits of the most ardent wishes.—One cannot, however, help being a little staggered at the idea of this cunning Frenchman having been so deceived, during such a length of time, and I am inclined, as to this point, to adopt the sentiments, so well and so forcibly expressed by the Editor of the *Times*, on the 20th instant:—"Still it cannot enter into our conception but that Massena must but be *ensuring his more absolute ruin* by these desperate movements in the face of a superior and victorious army; they are the most *singularly daring* of any that ever occurred in military history. Massena may have been urged to this rapid advance through the *wants* of his army, and the hope of anticipating by his celerity the *destruction of the resources* of the country, according to the system hitherto practised by the English General; and if *famine is warring upon our enemy*, it may have been as well to *suffer so useful an ally to perform its complete work*, and to clear a free range and scope for its operations, before we put in aid the sword: if, indeed, the latter is yet to terminate the dispute, we hail it as an auspicious omen that the conflict will take place near a spot already consecrated to the glory of the British name, the town of Vimiera."—The armies, however, passed through, or by, this town, at the distance of about 20 miles from where they now are.—This idea of our clearing a free range and scope for the operations of our ally, famine, is beautiful, and opens to one quite a new view of the matter. But, with submission, this clearing the scope for our ally may have been carried a little too far; because, we all know, how very formidable hunger is to the opponents of the hungry party. *It is said*, you know, that hunger will break through stone walls, and, therefore, we should, by no means, be desirous of seeing an army, under such influence, assailing our "fortified positions." If, therefore, I were to venture to point out any part of the campaign, in which I think it possible, that our Commander has committed a little oversight, it would be that he did not leave some little matter of eatables and drinkables to amuse the French on the way between COIMBRA and TORRES VEDRAS. But, he knows best; and, perhaps, the sooner

they got to him the better; the sooner he drew them into his last trap, the sooner would they be destroyed.—From the above-inserted Bulletin, it appears, that our army reached its long-meditated destination on the 7th and 8th instant, and that, *on the last-mentioned day, the periodical rains set in.* This seems to have been owing to something of a super-natural interposition; and it will, doubtless, be ascribed to “Divine Providence,” under which we have, agreeably to the expressions we so often see made use of, been so long carrying on the good cause. That we should have fine weather to get along all our cannon and baggage; that the Sun should shine, ’till our army got into the houses and huts; and that the rain should instantly set in, and, as it were, fall on the French without mercy, is, really, very surprizing; but, there is no reasoning against facts, and this fact, be it observed, is communicated to us in a *Government Bulletin*.—Let us now, by way of conclusion, take one more look at the relative situation of the two armies, the conflict between whom has, in all probability, taken place some days back, seeing that the French were in such distress for provisions, and, in the language of our authorities, *had nothing*.—In the *Courier* of this evening, it is stated, in express terms, that our Commander has planted, on his lines, *twelve hundred pieces of cannon*, which, at one piece in every *thirty-four yards*, would reach *twenty-three miles*, leaving, for that distance, scarcely room for a single Frenchman to creep through, though there were neither horse nor foot to oppose him. The same print says, that the right of our line will be supported by gun-boats and launches from the men of war; that (which can surprize nobody) Lord Talavera is *rather desirous* that Massena should attack him where he now is; that this position has been strongly fortifying from the commencement of the campaign; and that “Lord Talavera (when Sir Arthur Wellesley) has been heard to say, that, “if he could have the *choice of any ground* “to contend with the French army upon, “it should be Torres Vedras, where he “now is,” a choice, which, when we consider the security of the position, any fond mother would, doubtless, make on behalf of a darling son.—The *Morning Post* says, that nothing in nature can exceed the strength of our position; that supplies of all sorts are constantly moving from Lisbon towards the lines; that, the city

of Lisbon exhibits scenes truly warlike and terrific to the enemy; soldiers and officers at every step; processions of carts of 40, 50, and 60, at a time with provisions; commissaries waggons in dozens; mules loaded with biscuits in immense numbers; artillery moving along the streets towards the army; prisoners and deserters arriving 3 or 400 at a time, and *police horse guards* patrolling the streets in every direction; that while all is thus bustle and preparation and vigour and plenty on our side, on the side of the enemy all is misery, dejection, and languor; and, that, such is the state to which Massena is, at last, reduced, “our just resentment against him and his army, almost yields to that “*compassion*, which is the natural effect of “British generosity towards a fallen enemy, “and which, while we detest his atrocious “crimes, bids us *spare his life*.”—Thus ends (or in a few days must end, if our intelligence be true) the campaign in Portugal; and, I trust, that such an use will be made of success, purchased with so much treasure, valour, suffering, and blood, as will form some compensation to the country, to both countries indeed, for all the sacrifices they have been called upon to make, and have made, in order to insure it. To have defeated the French, to have cleared Portugal of them, will have been doing much in the way of *military glory*; it will have been doing much for our own fame, and have given a severe blow to the fame of the enemy; it will, perhaps have done more, towards the checking of the progress of France, than all that even we have done before. It will have removed the danger to have been apprehended as to an attack upon Ireland from the ports of Portugal, if those ports had not been thus prevented (for ever, let us hope) from getting into the possession of the French. This will be of great value to us; and, besides, there is every reason to suppose, that this terrible example made upon the army of Massena, will produce in the minds of the French soldiers, such a dread of us, as effectually to set aside all thoughts of an invasion of this or the Sister Island; for, if we thus beat them in a foreign country, under many disadvantages upon a general scale, what should we do with them here, where the very women and children would assist in knocking out their brains?—But, while I clearly see, and am, I trust, as ready as any man to acknowledge, the vast benefits of this total overthrow of the



French power in Portugal, and though I, by no means, wish to see any change of ministry, being of opinion, that such change would produce no one good whatever to the country, and would even retard any good that is to be hoped for; though these are my sentiments, as to these points, I cannot agree with the *MORNING POST* in the unqualified praises, which it bestows upon the Ministers for having projected the defence of Portugal and having reinforced our army there with every regiment that could be spared. It is very well to boast, now the result has been so fortunate; but, what would have been the tone, if the result had been the contrary? What would have been said, if Lord Talavera and his army had been one half of them cut to pieces and captured and the other half driven helter-skelter, head-over-heels, on board their shipping, and sent sprawling upon our shores like a parcel of half-drowned sheep in flood time? It is very good boasting now; but we are to consider, not only what is, but also what *might have been*; and, if we do this, we shall, I think, be persuaded, that the Ministers and their friends, ought to rest satisfied with moderation in their triumph.

JEFFERY.—The *Morning Post* of to-day, as well as several other of the newspapers, contain the following paragraph, from which it appears, that this poor fellow is actually alive:—"A private letter from Portsmouth, dated Sunday, has the following:—Jeffery, the seaman, was this day discharged from the navy, by order of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. He was immediately brought on shore by Captain Proctor, of the *Thistle*, and set off for London, with two Gentlemen, one of whom was said to be the Attorney of the Hon. Warwick *Lake*, and the other a friend. Captain Proctor had been sent to Boston by Sir John Warren, with the necessary documents to bring Jeffery to England. He found him working at his trade as a blacksmith. Jeffery's account of the transaction has appeared before the public: he now states nothing new concerning it."—I have no room to say much upon this subject; but, reader, is it not (if this be true) exceedingly good to see the company that *JEFFERY* is got into, upon his arrival in England? *Lake's Attorney*, above all men in the world! *Lake's Attorney* to go to re-

ceive Jeffery, and escort him to London! *Lake's Attorney*! And "a friend!" A friend of *Lake*, of course. How kind they are become all at once. How tender-hearted. Just as if there were no such place as *Sombrero* in the world!—But, this will not suffice. *Lake's Attorney* may, perhaps, settle the matter with the poor fellow; but, something is now to be done to prevent any other English sailor ever being treated in the same way again; and, this, doubtless, will be done, the moment that the Parliament meets.—*Lake's Attorney*! Who would have thought it?—That the man is really come there can, I should hope, be now no doubt; but, we shall see more of the matter in a few days.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
October 23, 1810.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRANCE.—Instructions, relative to Commerce, in the North. 15th Sept. 1810. (Concluded from p. 704.)

.....3. A minute will be drawn up of the delivery of each licence, to be signed by the Consul and the Director of the Customs; and notified to the military commandants at Hamburgh, Bremen, and Lubeck; who will report thereon to your Excellency. This minute, besides the descriptions in the body of the licences, will contain a specification of the packages of all the articles of merchandize composing the cargo of the vessel.—4. The same day that the vessel sets sail, the military commandants must apprise me thereof, and also notify the same to your Excellency. The military commandants will thus continue to notify the departure of every vessel sailing from any of these ports.—The destination of the vessels will be for Dunkirk, Nantes, and Bourdeaux.—5. For every licence there must be paid at the Port of Departure, and to the Treasury of the Customs, the sum of 60 francs for each ton of the burthen of the vessel for which the licence shall have been granted.—6. The vessels provided with licences may proceed direct to their port of destination in France, without being liable to be questioned for having been visited by English men of war or privateers. They may even land in a port of England the whole or such part as they may think proper, of their cargo,

without being questioned for having touched in England.—7. These vessels will be admitted into the ports of France, either in ballast, or with such articles of the merchandize of the North as are useful to the marine; and also with the productions of the soil of Germany and Poland, permitted to be imported into France, conforming nevertheless to the laws, tariffs, and regulations relative to the French customs.—8. Licenced vessels entering the ports of France above-mentioned may load, in return, wines, brandies, merchandize of French manufacture, and all other productions of the soil or industry of France; grain and flour of every description excepted.—9. Each licence will be in force only for a single voyage, including the going and returning. On re-arrival at the port of departure a fresh licence may be obtained on the same conditions.—10. The master of any vessel inclined to sail from the ports of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck, with a cargo, consisting exclusively of all other merchandize, of timber, spars, hemp, and other articles of the North, proper for the service of the French marine, may apply to the Directors of the Customs in the ports of France respecting the disposal of his cargo.—11. The laws relative to the embargo must be re-published, and put in full force in the three ports before mentioned.

ENGLAND.—*Famous Horse Guards' Order about the honours to the Conquerors in Spain and Portugal.*—9th Sept. 1810.

His Majesty having been graciously pleased to command, that, in commemoration of the brilliant victories obtained by divisions of his army over the enemy in the battles of Roleia, Vimiera, also in the several instances where the cavalry had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves against the enemy in Spain, and in the battles of Corunna and Talavera de la Reyna, the under-mentioned officers of the army, present on those occasions, should enjoy the privilege of wearing a medal; and his Majesty having approved of the medal which has been struck, is pleased to command that it should be worn by the General Officers, suspended by a ribbon of the colour of the sash, with a blue edge, round the neck; and by the Commanding Officers of corps (not being of rank inferior to Lieut.-Col.), and the Chiefs of Military Departments,

attached by a ribbon of the same colour to the button-hole of their uniform.—His Majesty has also been pleased to command, that the medals which would have been conferred upon the Officers who have fallen at or died since the above-named actions, shall, as a token of respect for their memories, be deposited with their respective families.—Lieutenant-Generals.—Sir John Moore, K. B. Sir David Baird, Sir John Hope, K. B. Mackenzie Fraser, Lord Paget, and Viscount Wellington, K. B.—Major-Generals.—Sir John Sherbrook, K. B. William Payne, Lord W. Bentinck, Hon. Edw. Paget, Sir Brent Spencer, K. B. Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart. Rowland Hill, Coote Manningham, W. Carr Beresford, Ronald Crauford Fergusson, Henry Warde, James Leith, John Randall McKenzie, and Christopher Tilson.—Brigadier-Generals.—John Slade, Moore Disney, William Palmer Acland, Miles Nightingall, Alexander Campbell, Henry Frederick Campbell, Richard Stewart, Hon. Charles Stewart, Ernest Baron Langworth, Alan Cameron, Bernard Foord Bowes, Henry Fane, Robert Anstruther, George Anson, James Catlin Crauford, and Edward Howarth (Artillery).—Colonels.—Sigismund Baron Low, King's German Legion; Robert Cheney, 1st Foot Guards, 3d Battalion; W. Anson, 1st Foot Guards, 1st Battalion; John Stratford Saunders, 61st Foot; Andrew Hay, 1st Battalion Royals; James Kemmis, 40th Foot; Robert Burne, 36th Foot; Rufane Shaw Donkin; Hon. Edward Stopford, 3d Foot Guards; George Townsend Walker, 50th Foot; Samuel Hawker, 14th Light Dragoons; and George Murray, 3d Foot Guards (Quarter-Master-General).—Lieutenant-Colonels.—George Duncan Drummond, 24th Foot; Richard Hulse, Coldstream Guards; George Leigh, 10th Light Dragoons; William Guard, 45th Foot; James Wynch, 4th Foot; Oliver Thomas Jones, 18th Light Dragoons; Denis Pack, 71st Foot; Sir Granby Thomas Calcraft, 3d Dragoon Guards; Lord Robert Edward Henry Somerset, 4th Dragoons; Robert Ross, 20th Foot; Alexander Napier, 92d Foot; Joseph Fuller, Coldstream Guards; Ralph Darling, 51st Foot; Sir Windham W. Dalling, 3d Foot Guards; James Stirling, 42d Foot; John Harding, commanding Royal Artillery; Samuel Venables Hinde, 32d Foot; Colquhoun Grant, 15th Light Dragoons; James Lyon, 97th Foot; Sir William Myers, 7th Foot; Thomas Sidney Beckwith, 95th Foot; Charles D.

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Taylor 20th Dragoons; Honourable George A. F. Lake, 29th Foot; Frederick de Arenschild, 1st Light Dragoons King's German Legion; Philip Cameron, 79th Foot; Alexander Gordon, 83d Foot; Richard Hussey Vivian, 7th Light Dragoons; Charles Donnellan, 1st Battalion 48th Foot; Charles P. Belson, 1st Battalion, 28th Foot; James Muter, 3d Foot; John Stewart, 9th Foot; Henry Torrens, 89th Foot; Daniel White, 29th Foot; John Brauns, 2d Line Battalion King's German Legion; Henry Seymour, 23d Light Dragoons; George Ridout Bingham, 53d Foot; Hon. Charles Greville, 38th Foot; William Maxwell, 1st Battalion, 26th Foot; Charles Fane, 59th Foot; James Bathurst, 60th Foot; Hoylet Framingham, commanding Royal Artillery; John B. Mackenzie, 5th Foot; Robert Barclay, 52d Foot; William Henry Bunbury, 3d Foot, commanding 1st Battalion of Detachments; William Robe, commanding Royal Artillery; George James Bruere Tucker, Deputy-Adjutant-General; John Cameron, 9th Foot, Jasper Nicols, 2d Battalion, 14th Foot; George Henry Duckworth, 2d Battalion 43th Foot; John Ross, 52d Foot, 2d Battalion; William Edgell Wyatt, 2d Battalion 23d Foot; William Iremonger, 2d Foot; Archibald Drummond, 3d Foot; Edward Copson, 5th Foot, 2d Battalion Detachments; Henry Craufurd, 1st Battalion 9th Foot; Edward Hull, 2d Battalion 43d Foot; William Douglas, 91st Foot; Chichester Macdonnell, 82d Foot; and Richard Fletcher, commanding Royal Engineers.—By his Majesty's command, DAVID DUNDAS, Commander in Chief.

FRANCE.—*Decree, relating to the Debt in Holland.*—Dated, Tuilleries, Sept. 23, 1810.

Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Mediator of the Swiss Confederation. Wishing to ensure the payment of all the arrears of the Government of Holland, anterior to its union with the French Empire, we have decreed, and do decree, as follows :

TITLE I.

Arrears of the Ministerial Services of Holland.

Art. 1. The 24 millions due by the Minister of Holland for services performed prior to 1810, comprising the sum of 2,700,000 francs, decreed but not paid,

shall be reimbursed and liquidated, according to the manner hereafter stated.

TITLE II.

Liquidation of the Arrears of Ministerial Services.

2. There will be established at Amsterdam a Council of Liquidation, presided by a Master of Requests of our Council of State.—3. All the arrears of debts for services performed and not paid shall be revised and liquidated before the 1st of July, 1811.—4. Every month, commencing from the 1st of November next, the state of liquidation of the preceding month shall be sent by the Arch-Treasurer to our Minister of Finance, to be submitted to our approbation.—5. Our Ministry of Finance shall transmit the state of liquidation, which shall have been approved, to our Minister of the Public Treasury, who shall cause the debts agreeable to the said statement to be paid in bills called Bills of the Syndicat of Holland.

TITLE III.

Of Bills of the Syndicat of Holland.

6. Our Minister of the Treasury shall cause 24,000,000 of Bills of the Syndicat of Holland, of 500 francs each, to be made; they shall be signed by the Secretary of the Syndicat.—7. These 24,000,000 of bills shall be divided into four series of 6,000,000 each. Each series will be payable from year to year, commencing from the 1st of January, 1812, at the rate of 500,000 francs per month.—8. The bills of the Syndicat of Holland will be conformable to the subjoined models.—9. They will be given in payment to the creditors. The payment will be made in Holland by the Paymaster of sundry expences. The first distribution of the bills of the Syndicat will be in favour of those possessing orders, not paid, on the Treasury of Holland.—10. The bills of the Syndicat of Holland will be received in payment of the arrears of contributions.

TITLE IV.

Of the Syndicat of Holland.

11. There shall be formed at Amsterdam a Syndicat of thirty members, at the head of which will be our State Counsellor Appellius.—12. The Syndicat shall be charged with the payments of the bills of the Syndicat of Holland, at the period they become due; for this purpose they shall watch over and accelerate the re-

ceipts of all contributions in arrear to the 1st of January, 1810, and especially the payments resulting from the ratification of the Registers, to the amount of 24 millions.—13. The Syndicat of Holland will have a particular chest, in which will be deposited the produce of the arrears of contribution. It may, by a division of the Council, allow some time to the debtors when it has more funds than are necessary for paying the bills. It may likewise employ a part of the excess of the recovered arrears, in accelerating the payment of bills by anticipation, and before they fall due. The Council will settle in a conference, the series or section of series of bills of the Syndicat which will profit by this anticipated payment.—14. We reserve to ourselves to decree, if there is occasion, when the definitive account shall have been presented to us, respecting what remains due above the 24 millions.

TITLE V.

Of the Payment of the Interest of Arrears of the Public Debt.

15. The sum of 30 millions at which is valued the amount of interests and arrears of the public debt of Holland, from July 1809, to Oct. 22, 1810, shall be paid in bills of 500 francs each, admissible in payment for the Imperial domains of Holland, or the redemption of domain tithes of the same origin.—16. There shall be deducted from our domain revenues of Holland, an annual sum of 1,200,000 francs, destined to serve as a pledge for the payment of the interest of these 30 millions.—17. There shall be created by our public treasury, orders for payment at half-yearly periods of 500 francs, for the sum of 30 millions, the amount of the said interests; these orders will be admissible in payment for Imperial domains and the domain tithes of Holland, they shall be delivered to the creditors to whom the interest is due from the public debt, by the Paymaster of sundry expences, in each chief town of the department.—18. The Director of our domains and the domain revenues of Holland, shall form a list of the country domains, of the domain tithes and houses which shall be sold, and the payment discharged in orders of our public treasurer, conformably to the above article.—19. The said domains shall be sold by public auction; the country domains and domain tithes shall be put at the rate of 25 times the amount of their

annual revenues, and the houses at 16 times their yearly rent.—20. The orders, admissible in payment of the said domains, will be transferable by the way of endorsement. An interest of 4 per cent. for the years 1812 and 1813, shall be attached to such of the orders as have not been employed in purchasing of domains during the year 1811. This interest will be first taken from the produce of the 1,200,000 francs of the revenue deducted from the general budget.—21. Our Minister of Finance will render us an account monthly of the amount of sales of domains, sold or redeemed from tithes, in execution of the orders above.

TITLE VI.

Discharge of divers other Credits.

22. Our Caisse d' Amortissement of France shall reimburse, at the stated time, the bills of exchange, payable by the Treasury of Amsterdam for the service of the year 1808 and 1809, amounting to 6,600,000 francs, including 172,000 francs for the loans made by the Treasury of Holland upon different pledges, and the sum borrowed upon the dépôt of cloves, amounting to 1,505,000.—23. The 1,920,360 lbs. of cloves, which are in the State warehouses in Holland, are to be placed at the disposition of the Caisse d' Amortissement, which will take care to successively sell it upon the most advantageous terms. With the produce of the sales it will reimburse itself to the amount of the advances which it must make in the execution of the above article.—24. Our cousin the Prince Arch-Treasurer, our Lieutenant-General in Holland, and our Ministers of Finance and the Treasury, are charged with the execution of this Decree. (Signed) NAPOLEON.

By the Emperor.

(Signed) H. B. Duke de BASSANO,
The Minister and Secretary of State.

GENOA.—Decree of Napoleon, relating to the Monks.—Sept. 25, 1810.

An Imperial Decree, dated the 13th of December, has been published here, by which all monastic orders and regular congregations of men and women, are definitively and entirely suppressed in the departments of Genoa, the Appenines, Montenotte, and Alps Maritime; and, in consequence, all exceptions made by anterior laws, decrees, and arrets, relative to the suppression of convents, in the said

departments, are revoked. The existing convents are to be shut up at the latest by the 15th of October next; and the religious dress is not to be worn from the 1st of November.

FRANCE.—*Commercial Decree.* October 3, 1810.

The exportation of French butter shall be permitted, but it shall continue only until the price be raised: That is to say—In the department of the mouths of the Meuse, in the marshes of Leyde and Delft, at two francs per kilogramme.—In the department of the Marsh of the Calvador, of the Lower Seine, of the Somme, and other maritime departments, at one frank and 50 cents. per kilogramme.—The duties of exportation are fixed by the kilogramme at 25 cents. for the departments of the Calvador of the Lower Seine, of the Somme, and other departments of Old France.—At 20. cents. per kilogramme for the departments united in 1810.

FRANCE AND BARBARY.—*Orders to the French Consuls, resident at every port in Italy.*—September 7, 1810.

It is the intention of his Majesty the Emperor, that Barbary vessels shall be treated in the same manner as Ottoman ships, as, like them, they may have loaded at Malta, and paid the duty of 20 per cent. to the English.—You, therefore, will immediately sequester all Barbary vessels which may be arrived, or which may arrive in the harbours of your division, with whatever goods their cargoes may consist of.—You will inform me as soon as possible of the sequestration, laid as well on Barbary ships as on Ottoman vessels.—You will forward to me the *Proces Verbal*, with all the documents you may have collected relative to the circumstances of their voyage, the origin and nature of their cargo, and the insurances (if any) as well on ship as on cargo.

NAPLES.—*King Joachim's Proclamation to his Marine Army.*—Camp of Melia, June 23, 1810.

Brave Sailors;—The expedition against Capri has entitled you to the gratitude of your country; and the battles of the 28th June, 1809, the 3rd of March, and the 9th, 10th, 12th, and 22nd of this month, are proofs of your bravery. Your King is

satisfied with your behaviour.—But nothing is done, so long as any thing remains to be done. Sicily opens to you a new field of glory; the expedition for delivering from the yoke of the enemy this beautiful part of my territories, is determined on. The English shall be driven from that island, and the glory of the Neapolitan navy will be immortal.—Brave Sailors! You will fulfil what I expect from you. The Great Napoleon fixes his eye upon you. In his name I confide to your intrepidity 20,000 of his braves, and 10,000 of your countrymen. You will assert in the face of Europe the honour that is reserved for you to transport so glorious a trust, and pass the strait of Scilla. Yes, you will land these brave fellows on the opposite shore. The wind will favour your noble efforts, and nought will remain for you but to give battle to an enemy, who supposes himself invincible because the sea is between us; an enemy that you have seen withdraw in the most cowardly manner from our islands, without attempting to land, as he had insolently announced in his numerous proclamations; an enemy, in short, who does nothing but burn our cities, and plunder and devastate the peaceable inhabitants of our coasts.—Brave Sailors, you will fight under the eyes of your King; he will always be in the midst of you. Honour and rewards await you. The hearts of your countrymen in Sicily call upon you. Swear to overcome all obstacles, to brave all dangers; swear to conquer, and you will conquer.

SICILY.—*The English Commander, Sir John Stuart's Address to the British Troops in Sicily.*—August 6, 1810.

The enemy, who announced his approach with so much pomp, who proclaimed to Europe his intention to compel the English, your allies, to withdraw their assistance from you, and who founded, on the expected plunder of this happy island, his hopes of rewarding his exhausted legions; this bragging enemy, who hardly having made the first step, boasted that the fate of Sicily was almost decided, and who fixed the eyes of the whole world on his promised enterprise, has been forced to keep his boats drawn up for their security under the batteries of the opposite shore of Calabria.—For two months he has remained ingloriously hesitating on the margin of that strait, the barrier between

you and his oppression; and he draws back at the sight of that element, upon which the force of his nation has only met with disgrace, and sees snatched from him a spot guarded by troops who hear his menaces with scorn, and view his spurious eagles with the most perfect indifference.—Brave and loyal Sicilians! You have anticipated the paternal wishes of your gracious Sovereign, who has told you, that by your fidelity towards his allies, he would judge of the place which he held in your affections. It is for the preservation of his throne and for your own safety that we contend.—Noble inhabitants of Messina! a connection of years has made us as well known to you as brothers; like brothers you have joined us at the first sound of impending attack. In the exemplary zeal and loyalty of your respectable governor, we have found the most efficacious support to our measures for counteracting it. Your principal magistrates, your nobles, have assisted us with their authority. Your citizens have laboured for us, and have obtained the reward of their labours. In our anxiety for your defence, you will judge of the sentiments which unite us to you. Persevere with firmness in the noble spirit which you now shew. Reject with scorn the title of subjects, with which the Usurper has the insolence to insult you. Let the enemy know that your sailors, your soldiers, and your citizens feel no other jealousy to their allies, except who shall be first in the glorious contest for the common cause. And rely with security, that wherever the standard of your lawful Sovereign shall be displayed in union with the banners of his august ally our King, we shall have but one destiny as we have but one cause, and that we will never separate except in the last extremity.

SPAIN.—*Acts of the Cortez.*—Sept. 24, 1810.

Don Ferdinand VII. by the grace of God, King of Spain and of the Indies, and in his absence and captivity, the Council of Regency, authorised *ad interim*, to all to whom these presents come: Know ye, That in the general and extraordinary Cortes, assembled in the Royal Isla of Leon, it is resolved and decreed as follows: The Deputies who compose this Congress, and who represent the Spanish Nation, declare themselves legitimately constituted in General and Extraordinary Cortes,

and that in them resides the National Sovereignty.—The General and Extraordinary Cortes of the Spanish Nation, assembled in the Royal Isla of Leon, conforming wholly to the general will, pronounced in the most energetic and public manner, acknowledge, swear, and proclaim anew, as their only and legitimate Sovereign, Senor Don Ferdinand VII. of Bourbon; and declare null, of no value or effect, the cession of the Crown said to be made in favour of Napoleon, not only on account of the violence which attended those unjust and illegal acts, but principally on account of their wanting the consent of the Nation.—It not being suitable that the Legislative Power, the Executive and Judicial, should be united; the General and Extraordinary Cortes declare that they reserve to themselves the exercise of the Legislative Power in all its extent.—The General and Extraordinary Cortes declare, that the persons to whom they delegate the executive power, in the absence of our legitimate King and Lord Don Ferdinand VII. are responsible to the nation during the time of their administration, conformably to the laws.—The General and Extraordinary Cortes authorise the individuals of the Council of Regency, that they, under that same denomination, in the mean time, and until the Cortes choose a Government more suitable, exercise the Executive Power.—The Council of Regency, acting under this authorisation, declared anteriorly, shall acknowledge the national sovereignty of the Cortes, and shall swear obedience to the laws and decrees which emanate from them; for which purpose, it shall pass immediately, when this decree is made known to it, to the Hall of the Sitzings of the Cortes, who wait for its performing this act, and are in permanent sitting.—It is declared, that the formula of acknowledgment and oath, to be taken by the Council of Regency, is as follows;—Do you acknowledge the Sovereignty of the nation represented by the deputies of these general and extraordinary Cortes? Do you swear to obey their decrees, laws, and the constitution to be established according to the sacred ends for which they are united, and to order them to be observed, and to make them be executed? to preserve the independence, the liberty, and integrity of the nation? the Catholic Apostolic Roman Religion? the monarchical government of the kingdom? to re-establish on the throne our beloved King

Don Ferdinand VII. of Bourbon? and to act in every thing for the good of the State? According as you act thus, may God assist you! but if otherwise, you shall be responsible to the nation conformably to the laws.—The General and Extraordinary Cortes appoint for the present, that all the tribunals and courts of justice established in the kingdom, do continue administering justice according to the laws.—The General and Extraordinary Cortes confirm for the present all the civil and military authorities, of whatever class they may be.—The General and Extraordinary Cortes declare, that the persons of the Deputies are inviolable, and that no action can be brought by any authority, or any individual, against the Deputies, except in the terms which shall be laid down in the General Regulation about to be formed, and for which purpose a Committee shall be appointed.—The Council of Regency shall be made acquainted with this, and shall forthwith pass to the Hall of the Sitzings of the Cortes, to take the oath pointed out; deferring the publication and circulation of this Decree in the kingdom, till the Cortes point out how it is to be done, which shall be declared with all expedition.—(Signed) RAMON LAZARO DE DOU, President. EVARISTO PEREZ DE CASTRO, Secretary.—Royal Isla of Leon, Sept. 24, 1810, at 11 o'clock at night.

SPAIN.—*Acts of the Cortes.*—Sept. 25, 1810.

By a Decree, dated the 25th of September, the Cortes are to be addressed by the title of Majesty; and the Executive Power by that of Highness. The publication of the laws which emanate from the Cortes, is to be made in the following manner:—"Don Ferdinand VII. by the grace of God, King of Spain and the Indies, and in his absence and captivity the Council of Regency authorised *ad interim*, to all to whom these presents come: Know ye, that in the general and extraordinary Cortes assembled in the Royal Isle of Leon, it has been resolved and decreed as follows," &c. The same Decree requires all Civil, Military, and Ecclesiastical authorities, to acknowledge and take the oath of obedience to the General Cortes of the nation.

SPAIN.—Sept. 26, 1810.—*Memorial addressed by the Council of Regency to the*

General and Extraordinary Cortes, and the Royal Decree in Answer.

Senor;—The Council of Regency desires nothing with so much ardour as to convince the nation of the profound respect which it feels for the laws, and of its proper performance of the arduous functions which have been committed to its charge. Guided by this principle, which shall always be the rule of its conduct, it hesitates not a moment to take the oath of obedience to the laws and decrees which emanate from the Cortes, agreeably to the copy of the Decree which your Majesty addressed to the Council by a deputation.—In that same Decree, by which *your Majesty* reserved to yourself the exercise of the Legislative Power in all its extent, it was appointed that the Council of Regency should in the mean time, and until the Cortes elect a Government which may be more suitable, exercise the executive power, under responsibility to the nation, conformably to the laws. The Council of Regency cannot stir a single step in the difficult career of the authority entrusted to it without knowing beforehand the precise limits of the responsibility to which that Decree subjects them; for how can they regulate themselves by it, if they know neither its latitude nor the boundaries by which it is circumscribed? If it be not clearly and distinctly pointed out, what are the obligations of the Executive Power, and what are the powers that are conceded to it? Without this clear and precise distinction, the responsibility expressed in the Decree will remain without effect; for the line of separation between both powers, not being fixed by our ancient laws, nor the powers peculiar to each, the Council of Regency will find itself between two extremes, in danger of stumbling upon either, notwithstanding all it may do to avoid it; either at one time exercising an authority, which may, in the opinion of the Cortes, not to be comprehended in the attributes of the executive, or omitting at another time, from the same respect for the laws, to use those powers which are necessarily included in the idea of the executive Government, and the free and expeditious exercise of which is at present rendered more necessary than ever by the circumstances of the State. In proportion as these circumstances imperiously demand that there be a rapid and continued communication between the two authorities, in order that they may contribute by their

combined efforts to the salvation of the country, so it must be of the greatest importance that the mode of pursuing that object be fixed and established by a Decree.—The Council of Regency awaits, therefore, your Majesty's declaration;—first, what are the obligations annexed to the responsibility imposed by the said Decree, and what are the distinctive powers which are entrusted to the executive; secondly, what rule or order is to be followed in the communications which must necessarily and continually take place between your Majesty and the Council of Regency —(Signed) FRANCISCO DE SAAVEDRA. XAVIER DE CASTANOS. ANTONIO DE ESCANO. MIGUEL DE LARDIZABAL Y URIBE.

Answer.

The general and extraordinary Cortes declare, that in the Decree of the 24th of September of this year, limits have not been fixed to the powers which are proper to the executive, and that till a regulation be formed by the Cortes which may mark them out, it do exercise all that power which may be necessary for the defence, security, and administration of the State in the present critical circumstances; and also that the responsibility which the Council of Regency requires, exclude only the absolute inviolability which belongs to the sacred person of the King. With regard to the mode of communication between the Council of Regency and the Cortes, till these shall establish a more convenient one, the mode now adopted shall be followed. This shall be communicated to the Council of Regency in answer to their memorial of the 26th of the current month.—Given at the Royal Isle of Leon, at four in the morning of the 27th of Sept. 1810.—(Signed) RAMON LAZARO DE DOU, President. EVARISTO PEREZ DE CASTRO, MANUEL LUXAM, Secretaries.

SPAIN.—Names of the Members of the Cortes.

Don Nicholas Maria de Sierra, Secretary of State, Principal Notary of the Kingdom, &c. makes known, that the Council of Regency, constituted in this royal isle of Leon from the 22d instant, in expectation of the wished-for moment of the installation of the General and Extraordinary Cortes, after having repeated the summons of convocation, circulated

by the central Junta, the opening of which meeting was fixed for this day; having caused it to be preceded by a most solemn public supplication for three days, to implore of the Father of Lights that illumination which is requisite for fulfilling the sublime objects of a Congress of which there is no example in preceding ages, in respect of the universality of the national representation, which has been organized and assembled; having arranged that, in order to accomplish as much as possible what is requisite for the Provinces unhappily occupied by the enemy, Deputies should be elected to supply these deficiencies from the emigrants from such provinces; and the Divine inspiration being again implored by the mass of the Holy Ghost, celebrated pontifically by the Cardinal de Scala, Archbishop of Toledo; and the moment having now arrived when the installation was to take place, it was arranged, that all the Senors Deputies from the free provinces, and those supplied for the provinces occupied, being met in the Royal Palace of Regency, should, in conjunction with the Supreme Council, pass forth to the parochial church of this Isle, where the mass of the Holy Ghost might be celebrated, and the hymn of *Veni Sancte Spiritus* be sung; after which, a short exhortation being delivered, the Senors Deputies were to make profession of fidelity, and take the necessary oath. All which was prepared and executed with that dignified grandeur which the interest and sublimity of the object required, and the following Senors assembled in the said Palace and Hall destined for their reception; Don Benito Ramon de Hermida, Deputy for the kingdom of Galicia; the Marquis de Villafranca, for Murcia; Don Felipe Amat, for the principality of Catalonia; D. Antonio Oliveros, for the province of Estremadura; D. Ramon Pover, for the island of Porto Rico; D. Ramon Sans, for the city of Barcelona; D. Juan Valle, for Catalonia; D. Placido de Montolm, for the city of Tarragona; D. Jose Alonzo y Lopez, for the Superior Junta of Galicia; D. Jose Rioboo, for the province of Sandago; D. Jose Cevero, for that of Cadiz; D. Manuel Ross, for that of Santiago; D. Francisco Papiol, for Catalonia; D. Pedro Ric, for the superior Junta of Aragon;

(To be continued.)